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I. INTRODUCTION
The forces of decay are ever-present in government because of man's
sinfulness. The sin that destroys lives also destroys governments....
Human government is not only limited by the sin present in it, but
that state may actually be destroyed by it, if evil is left unchecked.
The sinful nature of humankind is not a danger often discussed in
American government textbooks. In fact, such reflections are typically
reserved for the pulpit. Nonetheless, at Calvary Chapel Christian School
("CCCS"), high school students are exposed to this language in their
government book, they encounter Bible verses in their physics book,2
and they use an American history textbook which claims "progressives
had a faulty view of the nature of man."3 As a routine administrative
matter, the high school submitted the courses that use these texts to the
University of California ("UC") for acceptance as college preparatory
courses under the University's pre-college curricula policy for
undergraduate admissions, called the "a-g" subject requirements because
each letter represents one of the seven required high school subjects.
1. Maria Jo Fisher, Christian Themes Split UC, high schools, ORANGE COUNTY
REGISTER, Aug. 20, 2006, at 1, available at http://www.ocregister.com/ocregister/
news/homepage/article 1249055.php (citing TIMOTHY KEESEE, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
FOR CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS (1999)).
2. See id. at 5.
3. Id. (citing TIMOTHY KEESEE & MARK SIDWELL, UNITED STATES HISTORY FOR
CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS (3d ed. 2001)).
4. See University of California, "a-g" Subject Area Requirements,
http://www.ucop.edu/a-gGuide/ag/a-g/welcome.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2009).
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When UC reviewed CCCS' course syllabi under this policy, several
courses were not approved. UC's rejection of these classes has
launched a notable new arena in the religious curriculum debate.
For the nearly eighty-five years since Scopes v. State (Scopes
Monkey Trial),6 the controversy over religious curriculum in the United
States has been fueled by a single subject, biology, and the debate has
largely addressed the content of public primary and secondary school
curriculum. 7  However, as conservative Christian schools become
increasingly prevalent in the United States, and as universities create
stringent curriculum requirements for college admission,9 the focus of
the debate is shifting to whether public universities should accept a
whole host of private secondary school courses taught from a religious
perspective as prerequisites to admission. In light of this development,
Americans' love affair with the evolution and creationism debate must
expand to include a wide variety of newcomers: history, government,
physics, and literature to name a few.' 0 As a country, we must now
decide to what extent universities can, and should, create rigorous high
school course requirements for college admission that may preclude the
acceptance of some religion-themed courses.
As is so often the case with major policy issues, this decision will
initially be made in the courts. The first test case of the issue, a
constitutional challenge by CCCS and other plaintiffs to UC's pre-
college curricula policy, is already wending its way through the judicial
5. See Complaint for Abridgment of Freedom of Speech, Freedom From Viewpoint
Discrimination, Freedom of Religion & Ass'n, Freedom From Arbitrary Discretion,
Equal Protection of the Laws, & Freedom From Hostility Toward Religion at 23-24, 28-
29, 34-35, Ass'n of Christian Schs. Int'l v. Roman Steams (C.D. Cal. Aug. 2005),
available at http://www.universityofcalifomia.edu/news/acsi-steams/ (follow "ACSI
Complaint" hyperlink) [hereinafter Complaint].
6. Scopes v. State, 289 S.W. 363 (Tenn. 1927).
7. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 596-97 (1987); Scopes, 289 S.W.
at 369-70.
8. The vast majority of conservative Christian schools have been founded in the last
fifty years, and in 1993-1994, they constituted the second largest category of private
schools with 4,664 schools, half of which belonged to the Association of Christian
Schools International. See NAT'L CENTER FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, PRIVATE SCHOOLS IN
THE U.S.: A STATISTICAL PROFILE, 1993-94 / OTHER RELIGIOUS CONSERVATIVE CHRISTIAN
SCHOOLS 1 (1997), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs/ps/974 59ch3.asp.
9. Most public universities now require the completion of specific high school
courses for admission. See, e.g., University of Georgia, First Year Admission Criteria,
http://www.admissions.uga.edularticle/firstyear_admission-criteria.html (last visited
Nov. 22, 2009); Penn State University, High School Course Requirements for 4-Year
Degrees, http://admissions.psu.edu/academics/majors/4year/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2009);
University of Washington, College Academic Distribution Requirements,
http://admit.washington.edulRequirements/Freshman/Core (last visited Nov. 22, 2009).
10. These CCCS courses were rejected by UC. See Fisher, supra note 1, at 1-2, 5.
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system." UC uses a particularly rigorous pre-college curricula policy
that heightens the typical university curricula requirements to ensure an
academically sound student body.12  UC's policy requires that all
California high schools submit syllabi to UC for approval under the "a-g
subject requirements."' 3  Importantly, California applicants who seek
admission to UC may only count approved courses towards their
required pre-college curricula courses.14 When UC rejected the CCCS
courses that are the subject of the lawsuit, the reviewers not only
examined the course syllabi, but they also took the additional step of
reviewing the courses' textbooks.' 5 After this textbook review, some of
the courses relying on conservative Christian texts published by Bob
Jones University Press and A Beka Book were rejected.16 One book in
particular that concerned UC was a physics text that began each chapter
with a Bible verse.' 7 Republican Assemblywoman Sharon Runner, who
organized a meeting between UC and some Christian schools, claimed
the UC professors' only opposition to the physics book was the Bible
11. Ass'n of Christian Schs. Int'l v. Roman Stearns, No. 08-56320 (9th Cir. argued
Dec. 7, 2009).
12. See University of California, a-g Subject Area Requirements,
http://www.ucop.edu/a-gGuide/ag/a-g/welcome.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2009)
(requiring that students complete a specified number of "a-g" courses in high school that
have been individually approved by UC).
13. See id.
14. Although the University of California admits students in a variety of ways, the
most oft-utilized method of admission for Californian high school applicants is the
"statewide eligibility" process, which requires students to submit their grades and
examination scores, but also requires evidence of completion of the "subject
requirement." See University of California, Statewide Eligibility,
http://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/admissions/undergrad-adm/pathsto_adm/freshma
n/stateeligibility.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2008). The "subject requirement" is most
often satisfied through the submittal of fifteen pre-approved high school courses, though
in the alternative, students may complete a SAT Subject Test with a sufficient score (and
according to UC, scores in the bottom third have been approved). See Notice of Motion
and Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) & (6); Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support Thereof at 4, Ass'n of Christian Schs. Int'l v. Roman
Stearns, No. CV 05-06242 SJO (RZx) (C.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2005), available at
http://www.universityofcalifornia.edulnews/acsi-stearns/ (follow "UC Motion to
Dismiss" hyperlink).
15. See Fisher, supra note 1, at 1.
16. See Complaint, supra note 5, at 22, 28. It should be noted that although CCCS
claims the courses were rejected for their Christian perspective, forty-three CCCS courses
have been approved. See id.; Trounson, infra note 29, at A-I. Moreover, subsequent to
the apparent initial disapproval of Bob Jones University physics and chemistry texts,
these textbooks have now been approved by UC for use in future science courses as long
as the courses otherwise meets the a-g laboratory science guidelines. See University of
California, (d) Laboratory Science, http://www.ucop.edu/a-gGuide/ag/a-g/science-
reqs.html (last visited Dec. 11, 2009).
17. See Fisher, supra note 1, at 5.
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verses.18  On the other hand, UC claimed the concern was over the
"quality and accuracy" of the scientific content.19
In response to the course rejections, the Association of Christian
Schools International ("ACSI"), along with CCCS and six students,
brought suit against UC in A.C.S.I. v. Stearns,20 alleging the "a-g"
requirement is unconstitutional under the Free Speech Clause, the
Religion Clauses, and the Equal Protection Clause.2 1 Plaintiffs claim that
because of the multiple course disapprovals, it is more difficult for
students in Christian schools to gain admission to the UC institutions.22
The District Court for the Central District of California granted the
University's Motion for Summary Judgment, and the case is now on
appeal to the Ninth Circuit.2 3
This Comment addresses the extent to which public universities
may strengthen their high school course requirements for admission
without violating the constitutional rights of religious high school
applicants. The Comment begins with the provision of background
information on the status of American education, the legal and social
precedent behind this educational movement, and pre-college curricula
policies' susceptibility to constitutional challenges. Next, the
constitutionality of pre-college curricula policies will be examined under
the Free Speech Clause, Religion Clauses, and Equal Protection Clause.
The test case A.C.S.I. v. Stearns will also be briefly discussed. Lastly,
the public policy considerations will be examined, and a suggested
resolution will be proffered.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. Order Granting Defendants' "Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' As-
Applied Claims" at 20, Ass'n of Christian Schs. Int'l v. Roman Steams, No. CV 05-
06242 SJO (MANx) (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2008), available at http://www.universityof
califomia.edu/news/acsi-steams/ (follow "Order Granting Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment" hyperlink) [hereinafter Second Summary Judgment].
21. See Complaint, supra note 5, at 39-64.
22. At the time of the lawsuit, no CCCS student had been rejected by UC for the
actions alleged in the Complaint. See Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment and Granting Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 2 n.3,
Ass'n of Christian Schs. Int'l v. Roman Steams, No. CV 05-6242 SJO (MANx) (C.D.
Cal. Mar. 28, 2008), available at http://www.universityofcalifomia.edu/news/acsi-
steams/ (follow "Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and Granting
Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment" hyperlink) [hereinafter First
Summary Judgment]; Complaint, supra note 5, at 39-64.
23. The case was argued before the Ninth Circuit on December 7, 2009, and the
parties are currently awaiting a decision. Ass'n of Christian Schs. Int'l v. Roman Steams,
No. 08-56320 (9th Cir. argued Dec. 7, 2009).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Status ofEducation in the United States
In 1983, amidst the anxieties of the Cold War, a newly formed
government commission made the dire determination that America is a
"nation at risk."24 Surprisingly, the drafters of the report by that name
were not experts in foreign policy, national security, or weaponry; rather,
the resolute writers were educators. Armed with the fruits of nearly two
years of data collection, the National Commission on Excellence in
Education ("NCEE") unabashedly advised the Secretary of Education:
"If an unfriendly foreign power had attempted to impose on America the
mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might well have
viewed it as an act of war."25
Unfortunately, American educators today still grapple with many of
the same fundamental inadequacies that prompted the NCEE to make
such a bold pronouncement twenty-five years ago.26 Since the NCEE
report was released, politicians and educators have failed to find
solutions to familiar education inadequacies noted in the report, such as
faltering math and science performance.27 In an increasingly global
economy, America must quickly find solutions to these issues, or else
face diminished economic power due to the lessened value of our
workers. Within this context, it is both proper and advisable for higher
education institutions to use their admissions policies as vehicles of
reform toward the related goals of increasing the caliber of collegiate
student bodies and encouraging secondary education institutions to
produce better-prepared graduates. However, when universities
strengthen their admission requirements with mandatory high school
curricula, the change makes universities vulnerable to heretofore-unseen
constitutional challenges. 28
24. NAT'L COMM'N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK 1 (1983), available
at http://www.ed.gov/pubs/NatAtRisk/risk.html.
25. Id.
26. See id. at 1-2 (see "Findings Regarding Expectations" and "Findings Regarding
Teaching," discussing, among other things, low teacher salaries, inadequate math and
science education, and a lack of foreign language education); Dan Lips, Still 'a Nation at
Risk,' THE MONITOR, May 2, 2008, http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/
ed05608g.cfin.
27. See Sam Dillon, Study Compares States' Math and Science Scores With Other
Countries', N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2007, at A21; THOMAS B. FORDHAM INST., EDUCATION
OLYMPICS: THE GAMES IN REVIEw 4 (2008), available at http://epicpolicy.org/thinktank/
review-education-olympics (follow "Education Olympics 2008: The Games in Review"
hyperlink).
28. See infra part III.
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B. The Legal and Social Precedent
The issue of whether course requirements in higher education
admissions discriminate against religious high school students is a novel
one. 2 9  To date, religious constitutional challenges in the area of
education have largely focused on issues of public funding for allegedly
religious activities. 30  Alternately, higher education admissions
challenges under the Constitution are often based on considerations of
race or gender.3 1  The issue at bar combines both of these familiar
education law issues, blending the battle between church and state with
the equally controversial battle over allegedly discriminatory admissions
procedures.
Given the current educational trends, this battle has the potential to
escalate into full-blown warfare. First, the number of conservative
Christian schools has dramatically increased over the last fifty years. 32
Coupled with this boom, universities now frequently require that
prospective students complete a number of "college preparatory" courses
in high school that differ from the state high school graduation
requirements.3 3 Universities will likely continue to utilize these high
school course policies, and may look for ways to gather even more
course information under the policies, because research shows that the
29. See Rebecca Trounson, Rights Clash In Bias Suit Against UC, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
19, 2005, at A-1.
30. See, e.g., Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986);
Sheldon Jackson Coll. v. State, 599 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1979).
31. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 309 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 244, 256 (2003); Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Ga., 106 F. Supp. 2d 1362
(S.D. Ga. 2000); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978);
Michael Olivas, Constitutional Criteria: The Social Science And Common Law of
Admissions Decisions in Higher Education, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 1065, 1090 (1997).
32. See NAT'L CENTER FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, supra note 8.
33. See, e.g., University of Kentucky, Undergraduate Admissions, available at
http://www.uky.edu/Admission/homefroshapply.htm (follow "The Pre-College
Curriculum" hyperlink) (requiring four credits of English, three credits of math, three
credits of science, three credits of social science, two credits of foreign language, one
credit of history of a visual or performing art, a half credit of health, and a half credit of
physical education); cf Minimum Requirements for High School Graduation, 704 KAR
3:305 (Feb. 1, 2006) available at http://www.education.ky.gov/kde/instructional+
resources/high+school/refocusing+secondary/high+school+graduation+requirements.htm
(follow "704 KAR 3:305 Regulation" hyperlinks) (outlining the Kentucky high school
graduation requirements, which differ from the University of Kentucky's admission
requirements in that they do not require the completion of a foreign language); University
of Florida, Qualifying for Admission, http://www.admissions.ufl.edulugrad/fr
qualify.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2009) (requiring four credits of English, three credits
of math, three credits of science, three credits of social science, and two credits of foreign
language); cf FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1003.43 (2009) (outlining the Florida high school
graduation requirements, which are largely dissimilar from the University of Florida's
admission requirements).
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rigor of a college applicant's high school course work is one of the best
indicators of his or her collegiate success. 34
C. University Pre-College Curricula Policies and their Vulnerability to
Constitutional Challenges
Although most universities do not review syllabi like UC does,
many university pre-college curricula policies are already vulnerable to
litigation. Most policies require that applicants prove they have
completed a specific number of credits in English, math, science, social
science, and a foreign language, and some policies additionally require a
course in a visual or performance art. The methods of enforcement for
these policies vary, but most universities use high school transcripts to
verify that applicants have completed the proper courses, even when the
applications instruct applicants to self-report the courses that satisfy the
requirements.36 Any method of enforcement is susceptible to
constitutional challenges because all pre-college curricula policies
involve content-based decisions about which courses satisfy the
requirements. These subjective decisions are fraught with constitutional
problems because they depart from the more objective measures of
grades and test scores.
All policies will force admissions reviewers to draw distinctions
between courses in order to determine which courses fulfill specific
subject requirements. Some policies have built-in distinctions among
categories of courses, and these policies are arguably more susceptible to
challenge due to their overt rejection of particular kinds of courses. For
34. See, e.g., MICHAEL KIRST, EXPERT REPORT OF MICHAEL KIRST 1 (2007),
available at http://www.universityofcalifomia.edu/news/acsi-steams/. See Philip M.
Sadler & Robert H. Tai, Accounting for Advanced High School Coursework in College
Admission Decisions, 82 COLL. & UNIV. J. 7, 12 (2007) (finding that "two variables were
found to correspond to substantially better performance in college science courses:
increasing rigor of high school science experience and higher grades in high school
science courses.").
35. See, e.g., University of Oregon, Freshman Admission Information,
http://admissions.uoregon.edu/freshmen/requirements (last visited Dec. 8, 2009)
(requiring courses in English, math, science, social science, and a foreign language);
University of Michigan, Requirements, http://www.admissions.umich.edu/prospective/
prospectivefreshmen/requirements.php (last visited Dec. 8, 2009) (requiring courses in
English, math, science, social science, and a foreign language); Ohio State University,
Admission Criteria for Domestic Freshmen, http://undergrad.osu.edu/Fresh
Admissioncriteria.html (last visited Dec. 8, 2009) (requiring courses in English, math,
science, social science, a foreign language, and a visual or performing art).
36. See, e.g., University of Oregon, 2010-11 Admission Applications for the
University of Oregon and The Clark Honors College, http://admissions.uoregon.edu/
apply/pdf/2010-11UGAPPF.pdf (instructing applicants to report the courses that fulfill
the pre-college curricular, but noting that the reported information will be verified upon
receipt of the applicants' transcripts).
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example, a policy that explicitly precludes the acceptance of religion
courses, like the University of Washington's social studies requirement,37
is particularly vulnerable to challenges by religious high schools.
Furthermore, the University of Washington's English requirement allows
public speaking courses, but disallows acting courses; allows journalistic
writing, but disallows newspaper staff courses; allows business English,
but not basic English skills.3 8 Such detailed requirements are bound to
cause discrepancies over which courses fit into which categories, and the
inevitable course rejections may trigger lawsuits over perceived
discrimination.
Even without such explicit distinctions, curricula policies will
periodically compel reviewers to make difficult decisions about courses
when course names do not perfectly fit within one subject area. For
instance, a Christian high school applicant may try to categorize a course
entitled "Christian Biology" as a "lab science." When a reviewer sees a
course called "Christian Biology" on a transcript, he or she may wonder
whether the course is more similar to a religion course or to a science
course. If there is concern about the category of the course, the
university might investigate the content of the course, and this inquiry
may lead to the rejection of the course as a pre-college curricula credit,
thereby leaving the university susceptible to suit on the grounds that the
rejection was discriminatory, or that their policy is unconstitutional.
Therefore, even if most universities do not categorically exclude certain
courses or begin to require individual approval of course syllabi, the
typical pre-college curricula policies are already ripe for constitutional
challenges.
These potential claims of discrimination were first brought to light
by religious high school students, but universities are also vulnerable to
claims of discrimination by racial minority students, homeschooled
students, or charter school students. For example, public school courses
are regularly rejected by UC, and one study shows that racial minorities
in California are less likely than other students to satisfy the a-g
requirements due to a lack of approved courses at schools with high
percentages of minority students.3 9 Additionally, homeschooled students
37. The University of Washington specifically states on its admissions website that
religion courses will not count towards its social science prerequisite for admission.
University of Washington, Social Science, http://admit.washington.edu/Requirements/
Freshman/CorePDF (last visited Nov. 23, 2009).
38. See University of Washington, Requirements & Policies: Freshman,
http://admit.washington.edu/Requirements/Freshman/Core/English (last visited Nov. 22,
2009).
39. See UNIv. OF CAL. ALL CAMPUS CONSORTIUM FOR RESEARCH DIVERSITY &
U.C.L.A. INST. FOR DEMOCRACY, EDUC. AND ACCESS, REMOVING THE ROADBLOCKS: FAIR
COLLEGE OPPORTUNITIES FOR ALL CALIFORNIA STUDENTS 4-5 (2006), available at
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are particularly likely to feel that they have been subjected to
discriminatory admission practices because many schools already
publish separate, more stringent admission policies for these students to
ensure that they are prepared for college.40 Moreover, from a practical
standpoint, homeschools and other non-traditional high schools such as
charter schools, simply may not offer the courses required by a stringent
admissions policy. If significant numbers of students from these schools
are rejected by the public universities in their state due to the students'
inability to fulfill the pre-college course requirements, the schools will
have potential claims under the Free Speech and Equal Protection clauses
because the universities would be indirectly pressuring the schools to
conform the content of their private instruction to the universities'
mandates, and the universities would be treating a class of students
differently from other students. Although the potential claims of racial
minorities, homeschooled students, and charter school students will not
be analyzed herein, it is clear that A.C.S.L v. Stearns is an important
"harbinger for admissions policies at state universities nationally," 41 for
multiple categories of high school students.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF UNIVERSITY PRE-COLLEGE
CURRICULA POLICIES
The constitutionality of pre-college curricula policies will be
analyzed under the most probable sources of claims: the Free Speech
Clause, the Religion Clauses, and the Equal Protection Clause. While
the constitutionality of any given policy depends in part upon the specific
details of the policy, many general conclusions may be drawn from the
inherent traits all policies share. Moreover, throughout this section,
specific aspects of policies that some universities currently use, or that
universities might consider using in the future, will be analyzed as they
become particularly relevant under each constitutional clause.
idea.gseis.ucla.edu/publications/files/RR-ExecutiveSummary.pdf [hereinafter
ROADBLOCKS].
40. See, e.g., Penn State University, Homeschool Requirements, http://admissions.
psu.edu/academics/majors/requirements/homeschool/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2009)
(requiring from homeschooled applicants: "detailed documentation of their high school
coursework and evaluations of progress from an approved homeschool evaluator or
supervisor"); University of Georgia, Home Educated Or Non Accredited High School,
http://www.admissions.uga.edu/article/home-educatedornonaccreditedhigh-school.
html (last visited Nov. 22, 2009) (outlining the special admission requirements for
homeschooled applicants); University of Washington, Homeschooled Applicants,
http://admit.washington.edu/Requirements/Freshman/Homeschool (last visited Nov. 22,
2009) (outlining the special admission requirements for homeschooled applicants).
41. Carolyn Marshall, University Is Accused ofBias Against Christian Schools, N.Y.




One of the most prominent features of the Bill of Rights is the Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment, which commands: "Congress
shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech." 4 2 From this
provision, courts have extracted the general rule that the government
may not restrict expressive behavior on the basis of its content.43
However, the extensive free speech jurisprudence has muddied the
waters by introducing numerous constitutionality tests for speech,
dependent upon the varikty of speech and the regulation at issue. The
challenges and accompanying tests that are most applicable to pre-
college curricula policies are discussed below, grouped into facial
challenges and as-applied challenges.
1. Facial Challenges
Facial challenges, which challenge the text of laws in any and all
factual circumstances,44 have been labeled as a "last resort," and succeed
only when the plaintiffs show "a substantial risk that application of the
provision will lead to the suppression of speech." 4 5 If the text of a course
requirement policy mandated the content of high school courses, or
categorically excluded all courses taught from a religious perspective, the
policy could be deemed facially unconstitutional on the basis of
viewpoint discrimination. Barring such extreme policies though, course
requirements are likely to be facially constitutional, unless they run afoul
of the vagueness or overbreadth doctrines.46 Accordingly, these two
facial challenges are explored below.
The vagueness standard was perhaps most simply expressed in 1926
by the Supreme Court, which concisely opined that a law is overly vague
when citizens "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning."4 7 Ironically, this vagueness standard is itself guilty of much
ambiguity. However, the multifarious applications of the vagueness
standard need not be discussed here because the Supreme Court held in
National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley48 that "when the Government
42. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
43. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
44. See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 524 (1989) (noting that the
facial "challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act
would be valid.").
45. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 580 (1998).
46. Indeed, the plaintiffs in A.CS.I v. Stearns argued that UC's admissions
standards facially violate the Free Speech Clause because they are vague, and they also
challenged the policy under the overbreadth doctrine. See Complaint, supra note 5, at 59.
47. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
48. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
20101 1077
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
is acting as a patron rather than as a sovereign, the consequences of
imprecision are not constitutionally severe."4 9 Due to this deferential
standard for the "patron" government, it is now highly unlikely any
plaintiffs will succeed in vagueness challenges to university admissions
policies because when a university is bestowing grants of admission, it is
acting as a patron rather than as a sovereign.
In contrast, the overbreadth doctrine holds that government
regulation of free speech is overbroad "if it sweeps within its ambit a
substantial amount of protected speech along with that which it may
legitimately regulate,, 50 and the regulation impinges on the First
Amendment rights of third parties.51  Although vagueness and
overbreadth challenges are often argued simultaneously, they are not
mutually exclusive. 52 Thus, it is conceivable that a vagueness challenge
could be stricken while an overbreadth challenge succeeds. However, it
is unlikely that pre-college curricula policies are overbroad because they
only target one narrow kind of speech: high school classroom instruction.
Furthermore, because universities' unique "mission is education," they
are given more leeway to regulate within that important mission, and
thus should be less susceptible to the already rare facial invalidations.
2. As-Applied Challenges
a. Viewpoint Discrimination
The strongest free speech argument against a facially valid pre-
college curricula policy is viewpoint discrimination. In order to
determine whether a given policy constitutes unconstitutional viewpoint
discrimination, a court must first make a series of initial findings about
the variety of speech and the variety of regulation at issue because
different kinds of speech and regulations are subject to different degrees
of scrutiny. In this case, the first threshold finding is whether
49. Id. at 589.
50. Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 864 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (internal
citations omitted).
51. See City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 800-01 (1984) (noting:
"[T]he mere fact that one can conceive of some impermissible applications of a statute is
not sufficient to render it susceptible to an overbreadth challenge . . . there must be a
realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First
Amendment protections of parties not before the Court .... )" (internal citations omitted).
52. See Bd. of Airport Comm'rs of L.A. v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 572, 574-
77 (1987) (holding that a law prohibiting free speech in an area of the Los Angeles
International Airport is overbroad, but not vague, though the law was challenged on both
grounds).
53. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 n.5 (1981) (noting that universities can
make "reasonable" regulations within their mission of education).
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educational instruction is protected speech, and if so, whether pre-college
curricula policies somehow impinge on that speech. Of course, if either
of these findings are negative, the regulation is constitutional under the
Free Speech clause.
If the speech is protected and the regulation threatens the speech
though, it must be determined whether the regulation is content-based or
content-neutral. If the regulation is content-neutral, it is tested under the
O'Brien framework.54 This framework renders a regulation
constitutional if it is within the government's constitutional authority, the
regulation advances an "important or substantial government interest,"
the government interest is unrelated to the restriction on speech, and the
"incidental restriction" is narrowly tailored to the government interest.55
If, on the other hand, the regulation is content-based, it must next be
determined whether the speech is government speech because the
government may make content-based restrictions on government
speech. 56  If the regulation is content-based and the speech is non-
governmental speech though, it must be determined whether the
government is regulating the speech as a patron, and must make content-
based decisions about private speech to fulfill its government mandate to
bestow certain benefits to the public. When the government is acting
according to this kind of mandate, it may make content-based decisions
about private speech, but it may not discriminate on the basis of
viewpoint. If the government is not acting according to this mandate
though, and is imposing a content-based regulation on non-governmental
54. See City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 290 (2000) (applying the four part
O'Brien test to a general prohibition of conduct because it is content-neutral); United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (outlining a four-part test for content-neutral
speech).
55. See Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. at 290 (applying the four part O'Brien test to a general
prohibition of conduct because it is content-neutral); O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 (outlining
a four-part test for content-neutral speech).
56. See Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 127 S.Ct. 2372, 2381 (2007); Turner
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994); see also Rosenberger v. Rector and
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833-34 (1995) (noting that when the government
is the speaker, it may make content-based regulations).
57. See United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 205 (2004) (holding
that a law that conditions public library funds on the installation of an internet filter that
precludes access to sites with obscenity or child pornography is a permissible content-
based choice because "[p]ublic library staffs necessarily consider content in making
collection decisions and enjoy broad discretion in making them."); Ark. Ed. Television
Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 683 (1998) (holding that a public television station
may make reasonable decisions based on content when determining their programming);
Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 572-73 (1998) (holding that
subjective grant criteria, such as the desire for "artistic excellence," are constitutional);
Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866-67, 870-71 (1982) (holding that students have a
First Amendment right to receive information and that, while the school must make
content-based decisions, it cannot make the decisions based on viewpoint discrimination).
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speech, the regulation must be examined under the strict scrutiny
review. Each of these alternative findings are applied to pre-college
curricula policies in turn below.
i. Protected Speech
Instruction in the classroom is protected speech because it falls
under the category of "school-sponsored speech." 59 In fact, this type of
speech is entitled to special protection because of the school setting.o
Universities will likely claim that because their policies do not directly
regulate the content of courses, but rather only indirectly affect
classroom speech by incentivizing certain kinds of instruction, the
universities are not subject to Free Speech claims. However, even when
the government merely applies intense pressure to conform to its
requirements, First Amendment analysis is required.6' Therefore, any
policy which incentivizes certain kinds of high school instruction is
vulnerable to Free Speech challenges.
ii. Content-Based vs. Content-Neutral Regulations
If speech is both protected and interfered with by a government
regulation, the regulation must next be labeled as either content-based or
content-neutral. The distinction between content-based and content-
neutral regulations is an important one because the determination dictates
the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny.62  Content-based laws are
presumed unconstitutional and typically warrant strict scrutiny, whereas
content-neutral laws are not analyzed under this heightened standard of
58. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (noting
that content-based regulations are generally subject to strict scrutiny).
59. See, e.g., Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1286 (10th Cir. 2004) (noting
that "School-sponsored speech comprises 'expressive activities' that 'may fairly be
characterized as part of the school curriculum. . . .').
60. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (holding that
"educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the
style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as
their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.").
61. In Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, the Rhode Island Commission to Encourage
Morality in Youth identified books they found inappropriate for children, and then
notified the publisher and the police. See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58,
61-63 (1963). In undertaking a First Amendment analysis, the Court noted that "though
the Commission is limited to informal sanctions . .. the record amply demonstrates that
the Commission deliberately set about to achieve the suppression of publications deemed
'objectionable' and succeeded in its aim." Id. at 67.
62. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 59 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("The normal inquiry that our doctrine dictates is, first, to determine whether a regulation
is content based or content neutral, and then, based on the answer to that question, to
apply the proper level of scrutiny.").
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judicial review.63  Whether or not a pre-college curricula policy is
content-based is debatable; however, it is more likely, and one can
assume for the sake of analysis, that these kinds of admission policies are
content-based regulations because they favor some high school courses
over others, based on the subject matter and content of the course.6 In
spite of this presumed characterization, the policies are not necessarily
subject to strict scrutiny as content-based regulations because recent case
law has relaxed the standard when the speaker is the government, and
when the government is bestowing benefits with its regulations, instead
of restricting conduct. Therefore, a finding on these two issues must be
made before the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny becomes clear.
iii. Government Speech
The government speech doctrine is a new one;66 however, it is
important to determine whether the speaker at issue is the government
because if the government is regulating its own speech, it may regulate
the speech more freely.6 7 On the other hand, if private citizens' speech is
being restricted, the government has significantly less leeway to regulate.
The Fourth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits recently adopted a four part test
to determine whether an expression is government speech.68 This test
examines:
63. See Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 127 S. Ct. 2372, 2381 (2007); Turner, 512
U.S. at 642.
64. "[L]aws that by their terms distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech
on the basis of the ideas or views expressed are content-based." Turner Broad. Sys., Inc.
v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994). If a court instead finds that admission policies
requiring specific prior coursework are content-neutral, which is unlikely, the O'Brien
framework would be applied to determine its constitutionality under the free speech
clause. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (outlining a four-part test
for content-neutral speech); City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 290 (2000)
(applying the four part O'Brien test to a general prohibition of conduct because it is
content-neutral). However, this analysis will not be conducted here because it is unlikely
this type of restriction would be deemed content-neutral.
65. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833-
34 (1995) (noting that the government may restrict speech further when it is restricting
itself); Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2381 (holding that strict scrutiny is not needed in a few
recognized situations, one of which is when "the risk that content-based distinctions will
impermissibly interfere with the marketplace of ideas is ... attenuated," which is the case
"when the government acts in a capacity other than as regulator.").
66. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 574 (2005) ("The
government-speech doctrine is relatively new. . . .").
67. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833-34 (noting that when the state is speaking, it
may make content-based decisions).
68. See, e.g., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. ex rel. Griffin v. Comm'r of the Va.
Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 618 (4th Cir. 2002); Knights of the Ku Klux
Klan v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085 (8th Cir. 2000); Wells v. City and
County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1141 (10th Cir.).
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(1) the central "purpose" of the program in which the speech in
question occurs; (2) the degree of "editorial control" exercised by the
government or private entities over the content of the speech; (3) the
identity of the "literal speaker"; and (4) whether the government or
the private entity bears the "ultimate responsibility" for the content of
the speech, in analyzing circumstances where both government and a
private entity are claimed to be speaking.69
Since the promulgation of this test in the circuit courts, the Supreme
Court has specifically ruled on the issue, and in that 2005 opinion, the
Court failed to reference the test.7 0 The Court held that the government-
subsidized beef checkoff program, which forces beef producers to assess
a fee on beef to contribute to generic beef advertising, is constitutional
government speech.7' The rationale was that the speech is constitutional
because the government created the program and exercises significant
control over it, even though some private parties are utilized in spreading
this government message.72 Since this case, the Sixth Circuit has hinted
that the Supreme Court's creation and control test rendered the four part
test irrelevant, but the Ninth Circuit disagrees and continues to use the
four part test, informed by the Supreme Court's creation and control test,
as does the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.73
In sum, it is uncertain whether the four part test is still relevant, but
there is some authority for the use of both the four part test and the
creation and control test when determining whether the government is
speaking. In applying these tests to the speech at hand, it becomes clear
that the government is regulating government speech when public
universities review public high school courses for their compliance with
admissions standards, but the government is regulating private speech
when public universities review private high school courses.
69. Sons of Confederate Veterans, 288 F.3d at 618.
70. See generally, Johanns, 544 U.S. 550 (holding that the government subsidized
beef checkoff program, which forces beef producers to contribute to generic beef
advertisements, is constitutional government speech).
71. See id. at 566-67.
72. See id. at 563 (hereinafter referred to as the "creation and control test").
73. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Tenn. v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 380 (6th Cir.
2006) (rejecting the reasoning of an opinion because it used the four part test for
government speech instead of the Supreme Court's subsequent creation and control test);
Ariz. Life Coal. Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 965 (9th Cir. 2008) (utilizing both the four
part test and the Supreme Court's creation and control test to decide whether the speech
expressed through Arizona's license plate program is government speech); Pittsburgh
League of Young Voters Educ. Fund v. Port Auth. of Allegheny County, 2008 WL
4965855 at *9 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (agreeing with the 9th Circuit that both the four part test




When the university regulations are applied to public high schools,
the speaker is a publicly paid teacher who is following a curriculum that
is designed and controlled by the government. Therefore, the speech is
government speech. The categorization has specific implications:
[W]hen the State is the speaker, it may make content-based choices.
When the University determines the content of the education it
provides, it is the University speaking, and we have permitted the
government to regulate the content of what is or is not expressed
when it is the speaker or when it enlists private entities to convey its
own message. ... When the government disburses public funds to
private entities to convey a governmental message, it may take
legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that its message is neither
garbled nor distorted by the grantee.74
This valuable language from Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of
University of Virginia75 creates the distinction between government
speech and forum cases. According to the Court, a university may
regulate content when it is spreading its own message, or when it "enlists
private entities" to do the same, but it cannot open a forum inviting
diverse views from other parties and then regulate the content. The
forum cases are inapplicable to the issue at hand. 7 Therefore, when the
74. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833-34 (1995)
(internal citations omitted) (discussing the quote in Widmar v. Vincent: "Nor do we
question the right of the University to make academic judgments as to how best to
allocate scarce resources." Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981).).
75. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
76. Id. at 833-34.
77. National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley determined that the NEA grant
procedure is distinguishable from the forum cases because of its "competitive process."
Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 586-87 (1998). Similarly, any
course requirement in an admission policy is created to aid in the very competitive
process for entry into the university. Moreover, in United States v. American Library
Association, Inc., the Court found that although there are some untraditional forums, the
Internet at issue in public libraries was not a forum:
A public library does not acquire Internet terminals in order to create a public
forum for Web publishers to express themselves, any more than it collects
books in order to provide a public forum for the authors of books to speak. It
provides Internet access, not to 'encourage a diversity of views from private
speakers,' but for the same reasons it offers other library resources: to facilitate
research, learning, and recreational pursuits by furnishing materials of requisite
and appropriate quality.
United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 602 (2004). Like the library
Internet, a course reviewing board is not a forum because it solicits syllabi not to
"encourage a diversity of views," but to promote excellence in education. Id. Finally,
and perhaps most convincingly here, in Library, the Court recounted its decision not to
apply forum law in Finley, and it explained that the forum analysis would have been
contrary to the "inherently content-based 'excellence' threshold." Id. at 205. Thus,
because college admissions procedures are based on a similar excellence criterion, the
forum framework should not apply.
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university pre-college curricula policies are applied to public high school
speech, the government is regulating its own speech, and it may make
content-based distinctions among the high school course instruction it
regulates.78
On the other hand, when the university regulations are applied to
private high school teachers, this classroom instruction cannot be deemed
government speech because the speech is not part of a government
program, it is not controlled by the government in any way, it has no
governmental purpose, and the literal speaker is a private citizen who is
not paid with tax dollars. Therefore, this content-based restriction on
private speech would typically be subject to strict scrutiny review.
However, there is one final finding that must be made before the
appropriate level of scrutiny for this speech is revealed.
iv. The Patron Government
The final threshold determination is whether the government is
acting as a patron, and is making content-based decisions about the
benefits it is bestowing in order to carry out the mandate of a government
program. Recent cases have held that when the government must make
decisions about the bestowment of certain government benefits, it need
not meet strict scrutiny and may use the content of speech to make its
decisions, but perhaps only as long as minority viewpoints are not
stifled.7 9  The Supreme Court has found that a number of factual
scenarios fall within this necessarily content-based decisions category,
such as libraries' decisions about the content of the material they
provide, public television stations' decisions about the content of their
78. There is some judicial confusion regarding whether government speech can
merely be content-based, or whether it can also actually discriminate on the basis of
viewpoint. The Rosenberger Court seemed to take the former position because it held
that the government may make "content-based choices" when it is speaking. See
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833. However, the Fourth Circuit has interpreted this language
from Rosenberger to mean that government speech may discriminate on the basis of
viewpoint. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of S.C., Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786 (4th Cir.
2004). On the other hand, the Fourth Circuit's confident interpretation may not be
correct because Justice Scalia recently wrote that when the government makes content-
based decisions, it "can exclude speakers based on reasonable, viewpoint-neutral subject-
matter grounds." Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 127 S.Ct. 2372, 2381 (2007).
Therefore, it seems likely that the government may not make viewpoint-based decisions
in its own speech, in spite of the Fourth Circuit's holding otherwise.
79. See Library, 539 U.S. at 205 (noting that "heightened judicial scrutiny" is
"incompatible with the discretion that public libraries must have to fulfill their traditional
missions."); Finley, 524 U.S. at 587, 589-90 (finding a necessarily content-based
regulation facially constitutional and suggesting that a regulation which involves a
necessarily content-based decision would only be unconstitutional as-applied if it "raises
concern about the suppression of disfavored viewpoints.").
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broadcasts, the National Endowment for the Arts' decisions about the
recipients of art grants, and, perhaps most importantly, schools' decisions
about which books to remove from their school library.80
Any admission policy is very comparable to the necessarily content-
based government regulation cases, especially the competition for art
grants in National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, because the
university is bestowing a benefit, admission, and it must make content-
based decisions about the students that apply for that benefit. It should
be noted though that the university admissions process is potentially
distinguishable from this line of cases because in all of these cases, with
the possible exception of Finley, the necessarily content-based decisions
concern which private speech to make available to the public. University
admissions policies are not choosing which private speech to distribute,
but rather, are choosing which private speech to approve as consistent
with their government-funded education program. The university pre-
college curricula policies are further distinguishable because unlike the
government programs at issue in the necessarily content-based cases,
decisions about high school courses are not technically necessary to carry
out the universities' government mandate of improving higher education
in this country.8' After all, some pre-college curricula policies simply
mimic, or closely mimic, the state high school graduation requirements,
and therefore essentially require a mere diploma from any accredited
high school.82
80. See Library, 539 U.S. at 199, 214, 205 (holding that a law that conditions public
library funds on the installation of an Internet filter that precludes access to sites with
obscenity or child pornography is a permissible content-based choice because "Public
library staffs necessarily consider content in making collection decisions and enjoy broad
discretion in making them."); Ark. Ed. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 683
(1998) (holding that a public television station may make reasonable decisions based on
content when determining their programming); Finley, 524 U.S. at 572-73 (holding that
subjective grant criteria, such as the desire for "artistic excellence," are constitutional);
Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866-67, 870-71 (1982) (holding that students have a
First Amendment right to receive information and that, while the school must make
content-based decisions, it cannot make the decisions based on viewpoint discrimination).
81. The government mandate for universities includes various goals of excellence.
For example, the Obama administration has visibly posted on its website that it wants to
"have the highest proportion of students graduating from college in the world by 2020."
The White House, Education, http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/education/ (last visited
Nov. 24, 2009).
82. See, e.g., University of Louisiana at Lafayette, Admission Requirements,
http://admissions.louisiana.edu/basics/requirements.shtml (simply requiring the
completion of Louisiana's high school course requirements); University of Kentucky,
Undergraduate Admissions, available at http://www.uky.edu/Admission/homefros
happly.htm (follow "The Pre-College Curriculum" hyperlink) (requiring four credits of
English, three credits of math, three credits of science, three credits of social science, two
credits of foreign language, one credit of history of a visual or performing art, a half
credit of health, and a half credit of physical education); cf Minimum Requirements for
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If a court determines that pre-college curricula policies are
comparable to the cases in which the government is making necessarily
content-based decisions about the benefits it is bestowing, the policies
will only be subjected to intermediate scrutiny, which has no single
definition, but generally means something less rigorous than strict
scrutiny and more rigorous than rational basis review. Under this
deferential standard, a facially neutral policy will almost certainly be
constitutional, unless it imposes "a disproportionate burden calculated to
drive 'certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace."' 84 Therefore,
unless a policy is applied in a manner that establishes a consistent pattern
of discriminatory rejections, such a policy will likely satisfy intermediate
scrutiny review.
On the other hand, if a court finds that the policies are
distinguishable from the cases in which the government is making
necessarily content-based decisions about the benefits it is bestowing,
which is equally likely, the policies should be deemed content-based
regulations of private speech that are subject to strict scrutiny. In order
to satisfy a strict scrutiny review, the government regulation must further
a compelling government interest and must be narrowly tailored to that
government interest.85  Under this standard of review, it is likely that
admissions policies that require syllabi approval are unconstitutional
because although they fulfill an important government interest
(excellence in higher education), they are not narrowly tailored to this
interest because there are other, less intrusive ways of achieving that
goal, such as requiring the signature of a high school counselor to verify
completion of the required curricula. On the other hand, especially in
light of the evidence that high school rigor is a good predictor for college
success, it could be argued with some success that this type of policy is
narrowly tailored to the government interest in rigorous higher education
because reviewing syllabi is the only way to truly ensure that admitted
students have had a strenuous high school course load. If a policy does
not require syllabi review, but instead simply requires a transcript
High School Graduation, 704 KAR 3:305 (Feb. 1, 2006) available at
http://www.education.ky.gov/kde/instructional+resources/high+school/refocusing+secon
dary/high+school+graduation+requirements.htm (follow "704 KAR 3:305 Regulation"
hyperlinks) (outlining the Kentucky high school graduation requirements, which differ
from the University of Kentucky's admission requirements only in that they do not
require the completion of a foreign language).
83. See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 791 (1994) (explaining
the concept of intermediate scrutiny, and creating an additional level of intermediate
scrutiny, called intermediate-intermediate scrutiny).
84. Finley, 524 U.S. at 587.




review, the policy is even more likely to survive strict scrutiny review
because it is more narrowly tailored and is less intrusive on private high
schools' free speech rights.
b. Compelled Speech
In addition to viewpoint discrimination, there is one less infamous
as-applied free speech argument that is particularly applicable to
admission policies, and which may influence a conflicted court.
Potential plaintiffs may argue a university policy compels secular speech
in religious schools, especially if the policy requires the teaching of some
specific, secular concepts such as evolution. In the seminal case of West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,86 the Supreme Court held
that a Board of Education resolution compelling school children to salute
the American flag was an unconstitutional violation of the Free Speech
Clause because it compelled speech.87  Still, pre-college curricula
policies should not be vulnerable under this theory because they will not
typically compel any particular speech. The policies will likely only
compel secular speech if they require the teaching of specific concepts,
or if they force high schools to use texts from a pre-approved textbook
list.
To summarize, it is clear that classroom instruction is protected
speech, university pre-college curricula policies are content-based
regulations on that speech, the policies permissibly control government
speech when they are applied to public high schools, and they control
private speech when they are applied to private high schools. However,
it is unclear whether the application of the policies to private schools is
constitutional under the free speech clause. If a court finds that a
university's decisions about applicants' high school courses are
comparable to the necessarily content-based decisions about private
speech that the National Endowment for the Arts, public television
stations, and public libraries must make about private speech,
intermediate scrutiny will apply, and the policy is likely constitutional.
Alternatively, if a court finds that these policies are distinguishable
because the necessarily content-based cases usually involve the dispersal
of private speech and are absolutely necessary to fulfill their government
mandate, strict scrutiny will apply, and the policies may be
unconstitutional if the judge finds no compelling government interest or
a lack of narrow tailoring to that government interest.
86. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
87. See id. at 645-46.
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B. The Religion Clauses
The Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment collectively form the Religion Clauses: "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof...
1. The Establishment Clause
Lemon v. Kurtzman89 is the seminal Establishment Clause case.
Since 1971, the Lemon test has been the dominating framework in
determining the constitutionality of allegedly religious regulations.9 0
Under that test, "[flirst, the statute must have a secular legislative
purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion, finally, the statute must not foster 'an
excessive government entanglement with religion."' 91  Although the
Lemon framework has survived, the test has been altered over the years.92
Most importantly, the test is now expressed in only two primary
inquiries: whether there is a secular purpose and whether the effect
advances or inhibits religion.9 3
The latter inquiry, the effects test, is further divided into three
secondary tests: whether there is governmental indoctrination of
religion, whether the recipients of the government aid are defined by
reference to religion, and whether there is excessive entanglement of
religion and government. 94 The first two prongs of the effects test are
inapplicable to the issue at hand because they are specifically tailored to
a claim of government advancement of religion, not inhibition. This
inherent bias in the test results from the fact that the vast majority of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence addresses improper government
benefits to religion.95  The skewed nature of the precedent has even
prompted the Supreme Court to recently refuse to analyze a claim of
government inhibition of religion under the Establishment Clause, and
instead focus only on the Free Exercise Clause.96 For the sake of equal
88. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
89. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
90. See id. at 612-13.
91. Id. (internal citations omitted).
92. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 808 (2000); Agostini v. Felton, 521
U.S. 203, 204-05 (1997).
93. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 204-05.
94. See Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 536 U.S. 639, 662-63 (2002); Agostini, 521 U.S.
at 204-05.





treatment here though, the purpose test and the excessive entanglement
prong of the effects test will be briefly analyzed here.
There will almost always be a secular purpose behind any course
requirement policy, namely to ensure that collegiate scholars are
academically prepared. Facial neutrality is not dispositive, but if the
policy is facially neutral, a plaintiff "must be able to show the absence of
a neutral, secular basis for the lines government has drawn."97
Therefore, unless a policy explicitly excludes courses from certain
religious schools, or requires purely secular discussion in the core
curricula (in which cases it could be argued there is no conceivable
secular purpose for the distinctions), pre-college curricula policies will
likely have constitutional purposes under the Establishment Clause.
The question of whether there is excessive entanglement, however,
is not so quickly resolved. "[T]o assess entanglement, we have looked to
'the character and purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the
nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship
between the government and religious authority."' 98 Again, the criteria
are premised on the assumption that the claim is one of advancement of
religion. Therefore, only the last of these criteria may be analyzed here.
At first glance, it appears the relationship between the public
university and the religious schools that results from course requirements
is permitted under the Establishment Clause because the Court has held
that recordkeeping requirements and administrative contact that stem
from a generally applicable law or policy do not result in a relationship
of excessive entanglement. 99 However, in striking down the NLRB's
request to assert jurisdiction over two groups of Catholic high schools,
the Court held: "The substantial religious character of these church-
related schools gives rise to entangling church-state relationships of the
kind the Religion Clauses sought to avoid." 00 Therefore, if a policy goes
beyond a mere administrative relationship, it is especially susceptible to
an entanglement critique by religious schools.
This vulnerability will be enhanced if a particular course policy
employs officials to educate high schools about the policy. For example,
UC provides educators and "outreach personnel," also known as the
"Cadre of Experts," to help schools comply with their course
97. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 452 (1971).
98. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13
(1971)) (alteration in original).
99. See Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378,
394-95 (1990).
100. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 503 (1979).
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requirements.10 ' It could be argued that these UC personnel cause an
excessive entanglement, and that monitoring may be necessary to
maintain the separation of church and state, especially when the
"Experts" make instructional presentations to religious schools. 102
Furthermore, if a policy requires that a university representative
personally attend one or more classes throughout the year to ensure
compliance, it is even more likely the resulting relationship between
government and religion would constitute excessive entanglement.
However, challenges to UC's Cadre of Experts or any form of
public official monitoring are still likely to fail because Agostini v.
Felton'o3 held that the presence of public teachers in parochial schools
pursuant to a government remedial education program is permissible
entanglement under the Establishment Clause.1 04  Course admission
policies that require some instruction or monitoring in religious schools
are comparable to the remedial program teachers at issue in Agostini
because both involve public officials dispersing secular information in
religious schools for a publicly funded education program. Therefore,
there should be no excessive entanglement as a result of these policies.
Moreover, any entanglement that results from a pre-college curricula
policy will be less severe than the constitutional entanglement at issue in
Agostini because there is no daily student instruction, as there was in
Agostini. 
05
Finally, it should be noted that Establishment Clause jurisprudence
has specifically held that certain mandates of curricula are
unconstitutional. For example, statutes that require the teaching of
creationism or forbid the teaching of evolution are unconstitutional under
the Establishment Clause.'0 6 Pre-college curricula policies will not likely
require or prohibit the teaching of specific concepts related to religion
because such a provision would immediately raise Religion Clause alarm
bells. However, if a policy provides a list of approved textbooks for the
core curricular courses, and if such a list only included biology books
that teach evolution without contemporaneous instruction in creationism,
101. See University of California, Support & Assistance (Cadre of Experts),
http://www.ucop.edu/a-gGuide/ag/support.php (last visited Nov. 24, 2009).
102. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 221-22 (discussing the entanglement that results when
publicly funded teachers educate in religious schools).
103. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
104. See id. at 234.
105. See id.
106. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 596-97 (1987) (holding that the
Louisiana Creationism Act, which forbids the teaching of evolution without the
accompaniment of Creationism, violates the Establishment Clause because it advances
religion); Epperson v. State of Ark., 393 U.S. 97, 106-09 (1968) (holding that a statute




it could be argued that the state is effectively requiring the teaching of
evolution and excluding the teaching of any alternative religious theories.
Such a policy could be in violation of the Establishment Clause due to a
lack of religious neutrality because it indirectly forbids the teaching of
religious creationism theories in the science classrooms of religious
schools.
In summary, under the Establishment Clause analysis, a policy will
likely have a secular purpose unless it prohibits the acceptance of courses
from a particular variety of religious school, or prohibits the acceptance
of all courses taught from a religious perspective. Moreover, due to the
generous entanglement precedent in Agostini v. Felton, there will not
likely be any excessive entanglement associated with a pre-college
curricula policy, even if the policy requires instruction or monitoring in
religious schools. The only legitimate entanglement concern would arise
if the policy required or prohibited the teaching of specific religious
concepts, either directly or indirectly through the use of an exclusive list
of approved textbooks.
2. Free Exercise Clause
Free Exercise Clause analyses are conducted under their own
unique test. In its most recent Free Exercise Clause pronouncements, the
Supreme Court held that a court must begin by determining whether
there is religious animus in the law; if there is, the statute is
presumptively unconstitutional.o 7  If the statute is not a result of
religious animus, a court must determine whether the statute is facially
neutral and whether it is of general applicability. 0  In the absence of
neutrality, the government must show that there is a compelling
government interest and that the statute is narrowly tailored to the
purpose (strict scrutiny). 09  If the statute is neutral and of general
applicability, it is constitutional under the Free Exercise Clause as long
as it is rationally related to a legitimate government interest (rational
basis).''o
In addition to common law guidance, there are two federal acts that
must be considered in Free Exercise cases. First, the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act proclaimed that all free exercise claims must be
evaluated under strict scrutiny."' However, the law was subsequently
107. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 725 (2004).
108. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
546 (1993).
109. See id. at 546.
110. See id. at 531; Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1294 (quoting United
States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1126 (10th Cir. 2002)).
111. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb (West 2009).
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deemed unconstitutional when applied to local and state regulations in
City ofBoerne v. Flores.l12 Case law suggests that the law still applies to
the federal government. 13  Because state universities should be
considered extensions of state government, the Act should not apply to
pre-college curricula policies. However, the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 may nullify this inapplicability."14
In this 2000 Act, it was ordered that strict scrutiny be applied when the
government imposes a land use regulation that places a "substantial
burden" on the free exercise of religion by an "individual," which
includes religious assemblies and institutions."15  Thus, when religious
institutions challenge pre-college curricula policies, this Act would
require strict scrutiny, in spite of the neutrality and general applicability
of the policy, if a court determines that a policy places a substantial
burden on the schools' ability to use their property as they choose.1 6
Consequently, a university defendant that faces a free exercise
challenge to their pre-college curricula policy may have to demonstrate a
compelling government interest and prove the regulation is narrowly
tailored to that interest."' 7 Even if this high burden is imposed though,
universities will likely satisfy the standard because the government
interest in producing prepared college students is very compelling.
Additionally, there is likely no less intrusive alternative way of ensuring
preparedness because without a thorough review of high school courses,
universities would have to guess at the rigor of high school work based
on a given high school's reputation. Even a policy that accepts or rejects
courses based on individual reviews of their content, like UC's policy, is
arguably narrowly tailored because if every high school science course
qualified as college preparatory, the purpose of the guidelines would not
be fulfilled since they would not ensure any particular level of
preparedness. Therefore, a free exercise challenge to pre-college
curricula policies is likely to fail even if heightened scrutiny is applied.
In sum, if the judge determines that a course prerequisite policy
places a substantial burden on the exercise of religion in religious
schools, strict scrutiny will apply and the judge will have to make a
second discretionary finding: whether there is a compelling government
interest and if so, whether the regulation is narrowly tailored to that
112. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
113. See Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950 (10th Cir. 2001); In re Bruce Young v.
Crystal Evangelical Free Church, 141 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 1998).
114. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc (West 2009).
115. See id.
116. See Widmarv. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 (1981).
117. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (noting that strict scrutiny
requires a narrowly tailored compelling government interest).
1092 [Vol. 114:3
MOVING BEYOND MONKEYS
interest. Under this strict scrutiny test, a court could come to either
conclusion, but is likely to find that the policy is narrowly tailored to a
compelling government interest due to the strong government interest in
rigorous higher education institutions. On the other hand, if a court finds
that the policy does not place a substantial burden on religious schools'
ability to use their property as they desire, rational basis review will
apply, and the policy will likely be constitutional.
C. The Equal Protection Clause
The Equal Protection Clause provides that "No state shall ... deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 1 8
The first two steps in establishing an equal protection argument are
proving the existence of a classification under the challenged law, and
indentifying the appropriate level of scrutiny." 9 In order to identify a
classification, the law must create the classification, or, if the law is
facially neutral, there must be a discriminatory purpose behind the law;
discriminatory impact is not sufficient to make out a claim. 12 0  The
appropriate level of scrutiny depends on the nature of the claim.12 1 Race,
national origin, and "alien" challenges receive strict scrutiny.12 2 Gender
and non-marital children challenges receive intermediate scrutiny
review.123 All other challenges are reviewed under the rational basis
standard.124  Under these guidelines, a religious challenge under the
Equal Protection Clause would necessarily be evaluated under rational
basis review because race, national origin, alien, gender, and non-marital
children challenges are not at issue here. It should be noted that religion
is a fundamental right, and fundamental rights are typically awarded
strict scrutiny for equal protection claims.12 5  However, an anomaly
dictates that when a law does not violate the Free Exercise Clause, it only
118. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
119. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289-91 (1978)
(discussing first the existence of a classification, then determining the level of scrutiny).
120. See Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979).
121. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 686 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
122. Graham, 403 U.S. at 372; Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
123. See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686.
124. See Clark, 486 U.S. at461.
125, See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996) (noting that fundamental
rights receive strict scrutiny in equal protection claims); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S.
361, 375 n.14 (1974) (noting that religion is a fundamental right), superseded by statute,
Veterans' Judicial Review Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105.
2010] 1093
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
receives a rational basis review for the equal protection analysis.12 6
Therefore, if hypothetical plaintiffs win on their free exercise challenge,
which seems unlikely here, they will be awarded strict scrutiny for the
equal protection claim. If not, rational basis will apply.
Equal Protection challenges to pre-college curricula policies should
fail because there are not likely any classifications in policies on which
an equal protection claim could be based. As was previously noted,
equal protection claims require a classification, or alternatively, a
discriminatory purpose.127 Unless a course requirement specifically
excludes courses from a certain group of religious schools, which is
highly unlikely, or unless it can be proven the policy was enacted to
prevent the admission of certain kinds of religious students, which is
equally unlikely, these necessary elements will not be met. Plaintiffs
could potentially make out a discriminatory impact claim, but such a
claim would have to be brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, not
under the Constitution.12 8  Due to the lack of classifications and
discriminatory purposes in pre-college curricula policies, an equal
protection challenge should be swiftly dismissed without further
analysis.
In short, a pre-college curricula policy will only violate the Equal
Protection Clause if it creates a classification by requesting different
admission requirements from religious school students, or if it otherwise
has a purpose of preventing the admission of religious school students.
126. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 721 (2004) (noting that when the Court
determines that a law does not violate the Free Exercise Clause, rational basis will be
applied to the equal protection claim).
127. See Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979).
128. The Equal Protection Clause does not permit claims of mere discriminatory
impact. See United States v. Coleman, 24 F.3d 37, 39 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that
discriminatory impact is not enough to prove a violation of Equal Protection Clause
without accompanying discriminatory purpose). However, Title VI and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 allow claims of discriminatory impact. See United States
Department of Justice, Coordination and Review Section, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/
cor/coord/titlevi.php ("Title VI itself prohibits intentional discrimination. However, most
funding agencies have regulations implementing Title VI that prohibit recipient practices
that have the effect of discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin.");
Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 442 (1982) (allowing a disparate impact claim under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). Plaintiffs challenging a pre-college curricula
policy may have standing to bring a disparate impact claim under Title VI, but because
this issue does not involve employment, they would not be able to bring such a claim
under Title VII. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 284 (allowing a medical school applicant to




Finally, the unenumerated First Amendment principle of academic
freedom must be considered a defining concept in this case. The idea of
academic freedom is perhaps most ably expressed by former Supreme
Court Justice Powell:
Academic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated
constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special concern of the
First Amendment. The freedom of a university to make its own
judgments as to education includes the selection of its student body.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter summarized the 'four essential freedoms' that
constitute academic freedom: "It is the business of a university to
provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation,
experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail
'the four essential freedoms' of a university-to determine for itself on
academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall
be taught, and who may be admitted to study." 29
Thus, the concept of academic freedom clearly applies in cases
involving university admissions policies. As a result, both the plaintiff
and the defendant in these challenges will argue they should be given
deference because of their right to control the content of curriculum and
of the student body, respectively. However, because academic freedom
is not an enumerated right, it is unclear how much weight judges would,
or should, grant this discretionary concept.
In summation, a court could use the discretionary concept of
academic freedom to support either a finding of constitutionality or
unconstitutionality. Because there are legitimate arguments to support
either outcome under the Constitution, a judge could rule according to
his or her policy beliefs under the guise of a ruling on academic freedom.
The following synopsis of the initial summary judgment ruling in
A.C.S.L v. Stearns provides one example of how a judge could rule on
these constitutional issues.
E. A. C.S.L v. Stearns
The District Court for the Central District of California
demonstrates how one court has weighed the competing interests of
conservative Christian high school students and a public university's
desire to strengthen admission standards.' 3 0 In tackling the free speech
claim, Judge Otero ruled that rational basis is the standard of review
129. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (internal citations omitted).
130. See Second Summary Judgment, supra note 20.
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because the government must necessarily make content-based decisions
about admission to the university.' 3 1 Judge Otero held that as long as the
regulation is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose, and
as long as there is no government animus, the regulation is constitutional
under the Free Speech Clause. 132 Judge Otero further found that because
the case at hand is most comparable to National Endowment for the Arts
v. Finley, heightened scrutiny is not applicable.133  In applying this
deferential standard, Otero ruled that UC's policy is reasonable and is not
the product of religious animus.13 4 Moreover, the court found that the
regulation is not facially overbroad.'35 Additionally, the court rejected
the plaintiffs' claim under the unbridled discretion doctrine, which
strikes down laws that give government officials unbridled discretion
because they constitute a prior restraint on free speech. 13 6 Judge Otero
held that the doctrine is inapplicable to UC's policy because the
regulation is not a prior restraint on expressive behavior.'37 Furthermore,
he found that even if the unbridled discretion doctrine is a permissible
claim, it would fail in application because UC course reviewers were
given sufficient guidance on how to conduct their reviews.138
The Religion Clause challenges were more easily dismissed by
Judge Otero. He quickly found that the regulation does not violate the
Establishment Clause because it does not have the primary purpose or
effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, and it does not lead to
excessive entanglement between government and religion.139 Otero also
held that the regulation does not violate the Free Exercise Clause because
it is rationally related to a legitimate government interest and is not the
result of religious animus.140 Judge Otero applied rational basis to the
claim pursuant to the Supreme Court's opinions in Department ofHuman
Resources of Oregon v. Smith'41 and Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,
131. See First Summary Judgment, supra note 22, at 12.
132. See id. at 13.
133. See id. at 14.
134. See id. at 17-22 (holding that the guidelines are substantively reasonable, the
reviewers are qualified, the review process is not unreasonably probabilistic, and the
reviewing of only California high school courses is not unreasonable), 23-27 (holding
that there is no animus because the regulation is more like the scholarship program that
denied aid to theology students, which was not the result of animus, than the criminal
statute prohibiting animal sacrifice directed at a religious sect in Lukumi, which was the
result of animus).
135. See id. at 28.
136. See id.
137. See First Summary Judgment, supra note 22, at 30.
138. Id. at 28-31.
139. See id. at 33-34.
140. See id. at 35-36.
141. Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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Inc. v. City of Hialeah, which announced that neutral laws of general
applicability need not be subjected to strict scrutiny review in free
exercise challenges.14 2
Finally, Judge Otero held that plaintiffs' Equal Protection claim
should only be awarded rational basis review because UC's policy was
found not to violate the Free Exercise Clause. Furthermore, because it
was already determined that the regulation met rational basis review, the
Equal Protection claim had no merit.143
IV. POLICY CONCERNS
A. Pre-College Curricula Policies are Necessary
Universities must utilize pre-college curricula policies in their
admissions. First, there are signs that American students are being
outcompeted by students in many other countries. High school course
policies are one tool universities should use in the hopes of beginning to
compete internationally with other top education countries. Second, the
number of college applicants is rising, and in response, universities must
continue to find non-discriminatory methods of increasing their
selectivity. Course policies are perfectly tailored to this goal. Lastly, as
universities face significant numbers of non-traditional high school
students, they must find ways to fairly and equally assess the strength of
all applicants' prior curricula. Again, rigorous pre-college curricula
policies are the ideal tool for this task.
1. The United States' Need to Become Internationally
Competitive in Education
The trendy, catchall explanation for many of the worlds' dilemmas,
globalization, has long been associated with the symbolic international
spread of American corporate giants such as McDonalds and Wal-Mart.
However, the new face of globalization is hidden in the less glamorous
arena of education reform, and Americans must join other countries in
the quest for superior education if they are to enjoy the prowess already
attained in the corporate economic market. In the 2008 online
"Education Olympics," a compilation of international testing scores
released by the Thomas B. Fordham Institute, the United States ranked
twentieth in the total "medal count," of the twenty-three nations that won
medals.144 The United States finished with just one medal, whereas
142. See id. at 884-85; Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993); First Summary Judgment, supra note 22, at 35-36.
143. Id. at 36-37.
144. See THOMAS B. FORDHAM INST., supra note 27, at 7-8.
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Finland led the pack with thirty-five medals.145 Granted, little weight
should be afforded a single web-based competition, and at least one
article has already criticized the conclusions of the report.14 6 Still, the
Education Olympics generated unflattering press for a country already
facing increasing criticism about its math and science education. 14 7
Moreover, a recent report issued by the National Governor's
Association expresses deep concern about the economic implications of
the United States' lagging math and science scores and declining
graduation rates.14 8 The report concludes that "if the United States raised
students' math and science skills to globally competitive levels over the
next two decades, its GDP would be an additional 36 percent higher 75
years from now." 4 9 In order to ameliorate the inadequacy, the report
suggests that states adopt core curricula requirements at the K-12 level
that are benchmarked against international standards.150  The standards
would include the use of competitive textbooks, media, and
assessments.' 5  Some states have already recognized the need for
uniform core standards, and have adopted programs that aim to align
high school curricula with the state's public university curricula
admission standards. These state curricula programs, such as Indiana's
Core 40 program, 5 2 have been popping up with startling rapidity.
145. See id.
146. See Edward Garcia Fierros & Mindy L. Korhaber, Review of Education
Olympics 2008: The Games in Review, THE THOMAS B. FORDHAM INST., Oct. 10, 2008,
available at http://epicpolicy.org/thinktank/review-education-olympics (follow "Think
Tank Review" hyperlink) (calling attention to the methodological weaknesses in the
report, and casting doubt on the report's claim that low American test scores will
negatively impact the American economy).
147. See, e.g., A Disappointing Finish for Americans at Education Olympics,
http://www.usnews.com/blogs/on-education/2008/8/29/a-disappointing-finish-for-
americans-at-ed ucation-olympics.html (Aug. 29, 2008, 12:53 EST); Dillon, supra note
27.
148. See NAT'L GOVERNORS AssoC., THE COUNCIL OF CHIEF STATE SCHOOL OFFICERS,
AND ACHIEVE, INC., BENCHMARKING FOR SUCCESS: ENSURING U.S. STUDENTS RECEIVE A
WORLD-CLASS EDUCATION 5-6 (2008), available at http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/
2008/12/18/16nga.h28.h tml?tmp=1862657928 [hereinafter GOVERNORS] (noting that in
an international 2006 study American fifteen year olds ranked 2 5th in math and 21s' in
science, and that American college graduation rates have dropped from being tied for Is
place in 1995, to 14h place in 2006).
149. ROADBLOCKS, supra note 39, at 5.
150. See GOVERNORS, supra note 148, at 6.
151. See id.
152. See Indiana Department of Education, Indiana Core 40: Your Academic Edge,
http://www.doe.in.gov/core 40/overview.html (last visited Dec. 11, 2009).
153. Eighteen states offered college preparatory diplomas in 2002, but in 2006, that
number had grown to twenty-five. See American Association of State Colleges &
Universities, High School Coursework: Policy Trends and Implications for Higher
Education, POLICY MATTERS, July 2006, http://www.aascu.org/policy-matters/v3_7/
default.htm [hereinafter POLICY MATTERS]; JENNIFER DOUNEY, ALIGNMENT OF HIGH
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The University of California's a-g requirements can be viewed as
another such program designed to ensure competency in students in the
transition between high school and college, in the hopes of becoming
internationally competitive. UC was early to recognize that K-12 state
standards are not the only way to heighten international competitiveness,
and that universities could and should also capitalize on the trend toward
rigorous curricula standards. But with the public release of the
Governors' Benchmarking for Success Report, and with states'
increasing desire to create more rigorous uniform curricula programs,
other universities with an eye toward international benchmarks should
follow suit by strengthening their standards.
2. Universities' Need to Respond to Admission Trends
If current admission trends continue, universities will be forced to
become more selective due to the increasing numbers of applicants.
Conveniently for the country, this increased selectivity is also arguably
the most effective way to improve the quality of our universities. 15 4
Recent trends in college admissions reveal that grades in college
preparatory courses and the strength of high school curriculum have
consistently been the top factors in admission."' The more selective
American colleges, which often face difficulties distinguishing among
applicants with "similarly high grades and test scores," have begun using
the existence of honors and AP course work on transcripts to make
SCHOOL GRADUATION REQUIREMENTS AND STATE-SET COLLEGE ADMISSIONS
REQUIREMENTS 18 (2006), http://www.ecs.org/html/IssueSection.asp?issueid=76&s=
What+States+Are+Doing. Other states have begun requiring students to complete "a
college- and work- ready curriculum." See POLICY MATTERS, supra. Moreover, many
states have created education initiatives that attempt to train students to fit the local
economic needs. See Kathy Christie, Link Investment in Education to Economic Health,
STATELINE, Dec. 2008, at 237-239, available at www.ecs.org/html/clearinghouse/
Stateline-dec.pdf.
154. While there are other ways to increase academic caliber, such as hiring better
professors or funding more research, a university is, in essence, defined by its student
body; therefore, the best way for a university to increase its prestige is to admit only the
most qualified applicants. Furthermore, because research shows that strenuous high
school course work is a reliable indicator of collegiate academic success, the
strengthening of curricula standards is a relatively fail-proof way of boosting academic
success during college. See Philip M. Sadler & Robert H. Tai, Accounting for Advanced
High School Coursework in College Admission Decisions, 82 COLL. & UNIV. J. 7, 12
(2007) (finding that "two variables were found to correspond to substantially better
performance in college science courses: increasing rigor of high school science
experience and higher grades in high school science courses.").
155. See NAT'L ASSOC. FOR COLL. ADMISSION COUNSELING, STATE OF COLLEGE
ADMISSION REPORT 2007 iii, 34-35 (2007), available at http://www.nacacnet.org/
PublicationsResources/Research/Reports/Pages/default.aspx (follow "State of College
Admission Report 2007" hyperlink).
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admissions decisions.1 56  Additionally, selectivity has risen due to
increased numbers of applicants,157 and reliance on test scores has risen,
in spite of increasing concern about its reliability and susceptibility to
biases.'5 8  Although grades in college preparatory courses and the
strength of high school curriculum have not risen in importance, they
have remained top factors. 159 Due to the increasing pressure to move
away from test scores1 6 0 and to find non-discriminatory policies that
increase academic rigor and diversity (for example, Texas' top ten
percent plan),161 coupled with the increasing need to be more selective,
public universities will likely need to create more strenuous course
admissions requirements in the future.
3. Universities' Need to Ensure Proper Assessment of High
School Rigor
Not only must universities respond to admission trends, but they
must also ensure that the rigor of applicants' high school experiences is
fairly assessed. The need for fair assessment is perhaps most pronounced
when applicants have attended non-traditional high schools.
Homeschooling, for example, lacks the assurance that high school
accreditation provides. As a result, universities must critique
homeschooled applicants more carefully to ensure that they properly take
into consideration the rigor of applicants' high school experience when
comparing grades and other markers. Indeed, many universities have
instituted special homeschooled application policies, presumably with
156. Id. at 35; see also SAUL GEISER & VERONICA SANTELICES, THE ROLE OF
ADVANCED PLACEMENT AND HONORS COURSES IN COLLEGE ADMISSIONS 2 (2004),
available at http://cshe.berkeley.edu/publications/publications.php?id=72.
157. See NAT'L AsSOC. FOR COLL. ADMISSION COUNSELING, supra note 155, at iii.
158. NAT'L ASSOC. FOR COLL. ADMISSION COUNSELING, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
ON THE USE OF STANDARDIZED TESTS IN UNDERGRADUATE ADMISSION 7 (2008), available
at http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/custom/portlets/recordDetails/detailmini.
jsp? nfpb=true&_&ERICExtSearchSearchValue_0=ED502721 &ERICExtSearchSearc
hType_0=no&accno=ED502721 (follow "ERIC Full Text" hyperlink) [hereinafter
STANDARDIZED TESTS] (questioning the ways in which colleges are using standardized
test scores as a measure of the strength of college applicants).
159. See NAT'L ASSOC. FOR COLL. ADMISSION COUNSELING, supra note 155, at iii, 34-
35.
160. See generally STANDARDIZED TESTS, supra note 158 (questioning the ways in
which colleges are using standardized test scores as a measure of the strength of college
applicants).
161. Angela Hough, All Deliberate Ambiguity: The Question of Diversity, College
Admissions, and the Future of the Texas Top-Ten-Percent Plan, 39 TEx. TECH L. REV.
197, 198 (2006) (discussing Texas' plan that awards automatic admission to state
universities to students who graduate in the top ten percent of their class, as an alternative
to race consideration in their quest for diversity).
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this goal in mind.16 2 Although universities may seek to downplay these
differential standards,16 3 most would agree that universities are justified
in their differential treatment of non-traditional high school students
because they must effectively compare applicants' high school
experiences.
Like the homeschooled applicants, students from religious schools
receive a somewhat untraditional high school education because the
courses are taught from a religious perspective.'1' If the coursework
differs so vastly from that of public schools that the quality of the secular
course content suffers, extra procedural steps are justified for these
applicants for the same reason homeschooled students are commonly
subjected to special requirements. At a minimum, it can be argued that
high school course requirements for all applicants provide a modicum of
insurance against unequal high school comparisons.
B. Universities Must Not Discriminate Against Religious High School
Students in their Pre-College Curricula Policies
The question remains, however, whether these curricula-based
admissions policies actually disadvantage religious high school students,
and if so, whether we as a nation should be promoting them. Most
academically successful religious high school students yearn to be
accepted by prestigious colleges, just like their public school
counterparts. Due to this intense competition for coveted college spots,
the college admissions process must be examined for any biases and
discrimination. According to data collected by UC and the University of
California Los Angeles ("UCLA"), a bias already exists against UC
162. See, e.g., Penn State University, Homeschool Requirements, http://admissions.
psu.edu/academics/majors/requirements/homeschooll (last visited Nov. 22, 2009)
(requiring from homeschooled applicants: "detailed documentation of their high school
coursework and evaluations of progress from an approved homeschool evaluator or
supervisor"); University of Georgia, Home Educated Or Non Accredited High School,
http://www.admissions.uga.edularticle/home educated ornonaccredited.high.school.
html (last visited Nov. 22, 2009) (outlining the special admission requirements for
homeschooled applicants); University of Washington, Homeschooled Applicants,
http://admit.washington.edulRequirements/Freshman/Homeschool (last visited Nov. 22,
2009) (outlining the special admission requirements for homeschooled applicants).
163. Penn State University, for instance, notes in bold letters on its website that its
admission standards are the same for all applicants, in spite of the fact that it requires
extra steps for homeschooled applicants. See Penn State University, Homeschool
Requirements, http://admissions.psu.edulacademics/majors/requirements/homeschool/
(last visited Nov. 25, 2009).
164. See, e.g., Calvary Murrieta Christian Schools: Academics,
http://www.ccesmurrieta.com/secondary/academics.asp (last visited Nov. 25, 2009)
(noting the religious nature of the education).
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applicants from high schools with large numbers of minority students.165
The number of a-g courses available at high schools with high
percentages of racial minorities is significantly lower than the number
available at predominately white schools,16 6 and this dearth of a-g
offerings makes it "far more difficult" for those students at minority
schools to complete the necessary a-g requirements. 167 Theoretically, the
rejection of some courses with religious perspectives should similarly
disadvantage religious high school students. However, it is unclear
whether that supposition is true because at the time of the ACSI v.
Stearns lawsuit, no CCCS student had been rejected by UC due to a lack
of a-g courses.168 If research does demonstrate any disadvantage to
religious students under pre-college course policies, however, religious
schools may argue that the standards are unwise from a policy
perspective because they force religious high schools to secularize their
curricula, and they effectively decrease diversity in universities.
1. Pre-College Curricula Policies Must Not Force Religious High
Schools to Secularize Their Curricula
One crucial policy consideration, as argued in A. C.S.L v. Stearns, is
that religious schools are arguably being forced to secularize their
curriculum. A lawyer for the plaintiffs in A. CS.I v. Stearns exclaimed
that UC administrators "are trying to secularize private Christian
schools.... They have taken God out of public schools. Now they want
to do it at Christian schools." 6 9 Truly, if universities like UC begin to
increasingly disapprove religious high school courses as pre-college
course requirements, schools like CCCS will be forced to use more
secular textbooks and teach more secularized classes, or else face large
numbers of dissatisfied students who have been rejected from the state
universities. Aside from the constitutional concerns this coercion
creates, universities must tread carefully when encouraging specific
course conduct because of this negative policy repercussion that such
incentives would presumably prompt.
2. Universities Must Not Propagate Policies of Selective
Diversity
Furthermore, if it can be proven that strenuous curricula policies
disadvantage certain religious high school students, it can be argued that
165. See ROADBLOCKS, supra note 39, at 4-5.
166. See id.
167. See id. at 5.
168. See First Summary Judgment, supra note 22 at 2 n.3.
169. See Marshall, supra note 41.
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these policies should not be upheld because they decrease diversity in
public universities. Universities should not be able to cherry pick desired
types of diversity. In our quest for diverse student bodies, one would be
hard-pressed to argue certain religious groups should be excluded from
college campuses, no matter how orthodox, unconventional, or devout.
In today's globalized market, there is an unmatchable value in engaging
in collegiate dialogue with students from a wide range of geographic,
social, and religious backgrounds. After all, diversity secures college's
esteemed role as the "marketplace of ideas."170 Thus, students from all
kinds of religious schools must be afforded a full opportunity for
admission.
V. CONCLUSION
Most public universities' pre-college curricula policies should be
found constitutional under the Free Speech Clause, the Religion Clauses,
and the Equal Protection Clause. UC's policy was correctly deemed
constitutional by the District Court for the Central District of
California.17 1  However, this type of policy appears to be the outer
constitutional limit because if universities begin to implement even
stricter standards, such as requirements that direct the content of high
school courses, provide for the use of specific textbooks, or summarily
reject any course that contains a religious perspective, the policies would
likely be unconstitutional under these provisions.
The presence of compelling policy arguments on both sides of the
issue make any ruling on this issue a difficult balancing act. Moreover,
citizens from different backgrounds will view the issues differently.
Therefore, universities should not only carefully weigh the competing
constitutional and policy concerns internally, but they should also
consider conducting an external dialogue with the public, just as local
governments sometimes hold public forums regarding proposed
regulations. Such open communication would ideally create an
atmosphere in which individuals and organizations associated with non-
traditional forms of education could voice their concerns, and the
procedure would hopefully result in a compromise policy that is both
non-discriminatory and sufficiently rigorous.
Regardless of whether universities adopt this proposed procedural
step, they must find ways to strengthen their pre-college course standards
in their admission policies without risking court invalidation. In light of
the grave statistics and predictions about the United States' faltering
education system, the continued economic and political strength of the
170. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
171. See Second Summary Judgment, supra note 20, at 20.
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nation depends upon a rise in educational prowess.'72 Although states
could and should aid in this movement by improving K-12 education,
universities also play a crucial role in the process, and should make
changes accordingly. As the breeding ground for future politicians,
scientists, businessmen, and social theorists, universities hold the power
not only to remove the self-imposed conception that we are "a nation at
risk" educationally, but they also in many ways control our levels of risk
in the economy, environment, and modem social settings. This unique
position in society requires that universities strive for the highest quality
of education achievable within the confines of the Constitution. In
pursuit of this goal, the universities of the United States must admit the
most knowledgeable students, the raw material with which to shape the
innovators of tomorrow.
172. See supra notes 144-49 and accompanying text.
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